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Introduction 
While the recent process of globalisation has been underway for at least 50 years, its 
extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity have never before been so great 
(Held et al 1999). In the past two decades, too, globalisation has been facilitated by 
neoliberal ideas promoting a reduced role for the state and an increased role for the 
market dramatically increasing the number, reach and power of multinational 
corporations (Harvey 2005). Although it is evident that the global market system has 
grown beyond the control of individual states and inter-state organisations, many 
analysts continue to seek national, inter-national and regional regulatory arrangements 
(Cerny 2006). Yet expecting such institutions to regulate the global market in the 
interest of good economic, social and environmental outcomes misunderstands the 
new role of the state in a globalising world, which is to capture as much of the 
economic surplus generated by globalising capitalism as possible within its borders. 
Despite its regulatory weakness, the state will continue to play a crucial role in 
creating the base conditions for society and the good life in any neo-medieval, poly-
centric future (Ruggie 1993; Cerny 2006). Increasingly, however, the regulation of 
global capitalism for the economic, social and environmental benefit of all rests with 
global civil society, which must empower itself directly via its own institutions. 
 
In analysing global civil society’s capacity to regulate the emerging global market, 
analysts of global political economic systems are seriously hindered by two 
conceptual tendencies. The first conceives global business regulation in terms of hard 
law consisting of “command and control” legislation backed by the threat of sanctions 
(Kirton and Trebilcock 2004). Hard law solutions, as both neo-Marxists and neo-
pluralists eventually realised in the domestic context, were never as effective in 
practice in constraining behaviour in either socialist or capitalist systems. In socialist 
systems, scarcity caused by administrative allocation led to corruption, black market 
operations and the large scale flouting of legislation in the struggle to survive. In 
capitalist systems, hard law solutions are either initially compromised by industry 
lobbying or become weak over time as business buys the politicians it needs to secure 
its desired outcomes (see Lindblom, 1982). In neither case do hard law solutions 
result in adequate domestic legislation from a social, environmental and economic 
perspective.  
 
The second conceptual tendency is to treat global civil society somewhat 
homogenously, failing to distinguish among the myriad of actors operating in this 
sphere. For analysts not under the thrall of the state and interested in exploring the 
sphere of “non-state actors”, few sophisticated typologies exist. In this article, I focus 
on one specific global civil society organization—the Forest Stewardship Council—
and examine its formal organisational features to demonstrate two key points. First, 
the uniqueness of FSC’s organisational structure, constituting it as a sui generis 
institution in the world of global civil society; and second, its fitness to regulate the 
emerging global forest “polity”, reconceptualized in non-spatial terms for the new, 
globalising world. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the background to global civil society 
action on standard setting via certification and labelling, examining the rise of the 
Forest Stewardship Council as an institution. Next, I outline the institutional structure 
of the FSC by comparing it to the institutions of conventional representative 
democracies. This analysis demonstrates considerable parallels between FSC and 
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representative democracies enabling it to labelled a new form of global democratic 
corporatism. I argue that GDC is better fitted, in fact, to regulating the global market 
system than existing national or international institutions. Its effective operation 
requires, however, an expansion of our political imagination. In an era of 
globalisation—and with increasing numbers of humanity enjoying good levels of 
discretionary income—is no longer sufficient to conceptualise the political as situated 
within states and separate from market behaviour. From a social and environmental 
point of view, every purchase is a political as well as an economic act and we are now 
moving into an era when many consumers can exercise a political choice by buying 
certified over uncertified produce. Future global politics will not be merely about the 
outcomes of votes within states, therefore, but about the outcome of votes in the 
market as those who wish the world to be different vote for change on a daily with 
their pocket books.  
  
The History of Certification and Labelling 
There is nothing new about labelling products so that consumers can discriminate one 
from another. This is, after all, what marketing and branding are all about. Companies 
develop brand names and logos to inculcate consumer loyalty for otherwise “like 
products”. Such marketing schemes link the brand or logo with particular features of 
the product and/or the company (such as quality, value-for-money, service) in an 
effort to establish and protect their share in oligopolistic markets.  While its purpose is 
very different, small-scale producers adopted a similar approach in the 1970s to 
market organic produce. Quite quickly, a wide variety of local and regional organic 
labels emerged generating disputes over what constituted proper organic production 
and who was entitled to use the organic logo (Guthman 1998). These disputes proved 
difficult to resolve because, unlike private companies, the organic agriculture 
movement was fragmented both geographically and organisationally, and lacked a 
centralised body to coordinate and harmonise standards. 
  
As the organic movement grew in size and sophistication, practitioners in different 
regions met to develop baseline standards. The development of common standards 
logically entailed a process of certification to ensure that farmers were conforming to 
them.  In the 1980s, there were several initiatives in different countries to develop 
regional and national baseline standards, a process linked up internationally through 
the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). IFOAM 
developed a set of international standards for its accredited certifiers when 
considering a farmer’s request to be certified organic. The organic movement 
remained peripheral to mainstream industrial agriculture until the early 1990s, when it 
experienced a significant expansion as a consequence of several highly publicised 
food scares in the US and Europe. Until then, it was largely viewed as an unnecessary 
endeavour engaged in by visionaries and cranks (Guthman 1998, 136). Moreover, 
most organic produce was sold in local markets and did not compete head-to-head 
with industrial agriculture, especially in overseas markets. This is still largely the 
case, although there was a marked increase in the international trade in organic 
produce in the 1990s, and a consequent increase in industrial agriculture’s attempts to 
appropriate the practices and the label, often through government regulation of 
organic standards (Guthman 1998).  
 
Meanwhile, in the forestry context, the primary focus of activists during much of this 
period was tropical deforestation. Not only was forested land being replaced with 
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plantation agriculture as a consequence of government-sponsored development 
programs, but the evidence suggested that timber barons were recklessly logging the 
forests without any management plans leading to biodiversity loss, soil erosion, and 
riparian destruction. In 1983, these issues were brought to the attention of the newly 
established International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) by a large number of 
civil society organisations including the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
Friends of the Earth, and Survival International (Gale 1998). At the outset, there was a 
great deal of hope that the ITTO would be able to halt the destruction and degradation 
of the tropical rainforests, but by the late 1980s that hope had evaporated. By then, it 
was clear that the ITTO was hamstrung by political compromise and unable to take 
decisive action while a second initiative, the Tropical Forestry Action Plan, was also 
failing.2  
 
In England, where many tropical timber activists were concentrated, a small group 
began to explore the idea of using certification and labelling to improve tropical forest 
management. Koy Thompson, a forest campaigner with Friends of the Earth (UK), 
and Tim Synnott of the Oxford Forestry Institute, became intrigued with its potential. 
In 1988 they developed a feasibility proposal, endorsed by the UK's Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA), to explore the matter. ODA forwarded their 
proposal for funding to a 1989 meeting of the ITTO, where it ran into a storm of 
criticism from tropical timber producing countries and the timber industry, who feared 
that eco-labels would be a barrier to trade, encouraging consumers to substitute 
temperate for tropical timber.   
 
Thompson and Synnott's proposal was substantially “reformulated” at the 1989 ITTO 
meeting to address the concerns of producing country members. It is at this point that 
the history of forest certification starts to bifurcate. Along one path, the ITTO funded 
consultancies on the potential of forest certification. One early report on “incentives” 
for sustainable forest management was conducted by the Oxford Forestry Institute, 
but it largely ignored the option of certification and labelling, focusing instead on the 
feasibility of imposing a national levy (Oxford Forestry Institute 1991). A second 
study commissioned by the British Government through the London Environmental 
Economics Centre (LEEC) was more holistic. Completed in 1993, the LEEC study 
concluded that certification and labelling could be a small, but positive, incentive for 
sustainable tropical forest management. LEEC proposed that governments consider 
sponsoring national certification schemes, but this suggestion met with strident 
opposition from developing countries and the forest industry assembled at the ITTO. 
The producing countries as a group were so opposed to considering certification and 
labelling that they forced interested ITTO members to debate the matter in a special 
meeting organised outside of ITTO’s regular session. The most the ITTO could do 
was to monitor the issue of certification and labelling, an activity it effectively 
accomplished by commissioning regular consultancy reports on the topic (Ghazali and 
Simula 1994, 1996 & 1998; Eba'a and  Simula 2002; Pinto de Abreu and Simula 
2004; Simula et al 2004).  
 
                                                 
2
 The Tropical Forestry Action Plan was the combined initiative of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Development Program, the World Resources 
Institute and the World Bank.  
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While these initiatives were unfolding at the ITTO and in England, certification was 
being moved forward in North America via the establishment, in 1989, of the 
Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood Program. They were joined in the early 1990s by 
another certifying body, Scientific Certification Systems, operating out of Oakwood, 
California. Both groups used their own standards to certify forests, with SmartWood 
being the first to commence operations in 1990. As the number of certifiers grew—the 
Soil Association and Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS) also began to certify 
operations in the early 1990s—concern developed over the proliferation of standards 
of “sustainable forestry management”. At about this time, too, Herman Kwisthout, a 
bagpipe producer in Britain and manager of a timber import business, the Ecological 
Trading Company, began to inquire about the sustainability of the tropical timber he 
was importing from developing countries for the wooden components of his 
instruments. His inquiries with the Rainforest Foundation and, later, WWF about 
ways to secure the sustainability of tropical timber were a catalyst for action, as was 
the failure of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to 
negotiate a global forest treaty. By 1992, the ITTO consultancies had provided a 
theoretical rationale for forest certification, while the SmartWood Program, Scientific 
Certification Systems and others had demonstrated its practical feasibility. What 
remained to be achieved was the integration of the emerging separate, certifier-based 
programs into a more coherent, global forest certification system.  
 
The spark for this global initiative came from a somewhat obscure Californian group 
called the Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection (WARP), which in the 
early 1990s had become concerned about the proliferation of certifying-body labels 
and proposed the establishment of an international forest stewardship council to 
ensure international standardization. WARP considered a proposal by Kwisthout to 
establish an International Forest Monitoring Agency and this suggestion spawned the 
formation of an interim FSC Board in 1992, which was funded by WWF and 
supported by the Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood program.3  
 
The challenge confronting the FSC Interim Board was daunting: to create a global 
certification network linking interests in North and South America, Europe, Asia and 
Africa.  To this end, complex negotiations were undertaken with a range of 
stakeholders and certifying bodies throughout 1992 and into 1993. These culminated 
in the founding of the Forest Stewardship Council at a difficult meeting in Toronto, 
Canada, in October 1993. Some environmental and indigenous groups were furious 
that industry representatives had been invited to attend and were eligible to vote 
(Hammond 1993). They worried that industry would take control of the FSC, dilute 
its Principles and Criteria, and perpetuate business-as-usual forestry. This concern 
extended to the draft FSC Principles and Criteria, which were viewed by some 
environmental and indigenous groups as too industry-friendly. Although at one point 
the meeting looked like it would end in deadlock, eventually a compromise occurred. 
An organizational structure designed to preclude industry dominance was agreed upon 
                                                 
3
 Members of the FSC Interim Board were Julio Centeno, Chris Elliott, Debbie Hammel, Dagoberto 
Irias, Dominique Irvine, Alan Knight, and Andrew Poynter. The Interim Board was broadly 
representative of what later came to be FSC’s three chambers, with Centeno and Irias representing the 
South, Irvine representing indigenous people through her role in Cultural Survival Inc., Knight 
representing industry via B&Q (a major UK building supplies retailer), and Elliott the environmental 
movement through his role as Forest Officer with WWF International. The Interim Board was assisted 
by Alan Pierce and Jamie Ervin, and was run out of Burlington, Vermont in the US Northeast. 
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and a draft set of Principles and Criteria were accepted on the basis that they were 
subject to ongoing revision and review.  
 
The founding of the FSC was closely monitored by the mainstream forest industry. By 
1993, many industry leaders were convinced of the strategic necessity of developing 
alternative certification schemes. For example, in North America, the Canadian Pulp 
and Paper Association (CPPA) donated a million dollars to the Canadian Standards 
Association to develop a Canadian scheme based on an environmental management 
standards approach adapted from the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). At about the same time, the American Forestry & Paper Association 
established what became the Sustainable Forestry Initiative. In Indonesia, efforts 
commenced to re-invigorate the development of a national eco-label, culminating in 
the establishment of Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia. In the United Kingdom, pressure 
mounted on the Forestry Commission to develop a British Standard. Following the 
development of an FSC-UK Standard in 1998—and as a consequence of the peculiar 
structural features of Britain’s timber industry interacting with the policy 
entrepreneurship of a small number of key individuals—stakeholders eventually 
translated the FSC-UK Standard into a British national standard—the UK Woodland 
Assurance Scheme (UKWAS)—in 1999.  
 
Today, while there is a plethora of forest certification schemes worldwide, the most 
rigorous by far remains the FSC. Unlike its industry- and state-sponsored imitators, 
FSC can make good claims to legitimacy in terms of its institutional arrangements, 
which are set out in detail in the next section.  
 
The Forest Stewardship Council 
On paper and in practice, no other forest certification scheme rivals the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) for the sophistication and complexity of governing 
arrangements. To achieve the ambitious aspirations articulated in its Principles and 
Criteria, it has combined a complex global democratic architecture with a deep 
deliberative process to promote dialogue, equality, and transparency. By deploying an 
array of constitutional checks and balances, FSC responds to the identified needs and 
priorities of its constituents. Given the diverse interests housed within this 
organizational structure, including the ever-present North-South tension, the 
magnitude of the challenge that this entails——to mediate disputes and oversee 
standards harmonization and to continually update its regulations and procedures to 
take account of emerging knowledge and stakeholder concerns—can scarcely be 
overstated.4 
 
In this paper, I undertake the task of understanding and characterizing the institutional 
form of the FSC-IC by examining its formal architecture and deliberative processes. 
In this regard, the extent to which the FSC model emulates and elaborates established 
constitutional norms and mechanisms of democratic states is striking.  Adopting the 
lens of comparative constitutionalism, it becomes apparent that the FSC emulates the 
architecture and processes of modern democracies from the duties it imposes on 
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members (e.g. to affirm and uphold its Principles and Criteria and By-Laws) to the 
various roles and responsibilities assigned to its ‘Executive’, ‘Legislative’ and 
‘Judicial’ branches, to the exercise of its regulatory and dispute resolution functions.  
The paper is structured around the four basic elements of any constitution: a 
preamble, an organisational chart, an amending clause and a bill of rights. According 
to Landis (1987, 60), a preamble sets out “the goals and principles of the polity” in 
motivational and rhetorical language. The organization chart, in contrast, provides a 
“power map of the polity”, delineating “whether the political institutions are to be 
federal or unitary, presidential or parliamentary in nature”, and which tasks are to be 
performed by which level of government (Ibid). The purpose of the amending formula 
is to enable constitutional adjustment to changing circumstances over time, with 
amending clauses “often made difficult to use, on the assumption that the ‘supreme 
law of the land’ should not routinely changed or manipulated (Ibid). Finally, 
constitutions often include a bill of rights that are designed to set out the fundamental 
rights and freedoms that a citizen is permitted to enjoy. Using this framework, it 
becomes abundantly clear just how “state-like” FSC is in structure, especially in its 
efforts to establish a set of governance checks and balances within its constitutional 
provisions to prevent single-interest, single-state or Northern domination.  
 
FSC’s ‘constitution’ is written down in two foundational documents, its Statutes and 
By-Laws,5 which together establish its vision, structure and process for amendment.  
There is no bill of rights, but in this FSC is no different from many other states. The 
Canadian Constitution lacked a Bill of Rights until 1960, and that Bill was later 
superceded by the Charter of Rights contained in the 1982 Constitution. The 
Australian Constitution currently lacks a bill of rights, a source of concern to many 
there in the increasingly illiberal era dominated by the “war on terror”. And even the 
original American Constitution lacked a bill of rights although this was quickly 
changed in 1791 with the adoption of the ten amendments to guarantee basic civil and 
political liberties such as free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention. In terms of comparative constitutionalism, at the 
present time a formal bill of rights can be considered a desirable as opposed to an 
essential component.  
 
Preamble 
The purpose of a constitution is to found a state consisting of a “people” occupying a 
given territory over which sovereignty is exercised. Perhaps the best known, if 
rhetorical, example of a preamble is that from the US Constitution, which states that, 
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, 
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America” (National 
Archives 2006). In contrast, the original Canadian Constitution is more prosaic, 
observing simply that several provinces have “expressed their desire to be federally 
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united into one dominion”.6 Notably, however, neither preamble indicates how “the 
people” came to be formed, preferring to presume the prior existence of Americans on 
the one hand and Canadians on the other.  
 
In an analogous manner, FSC-IC presumes the existence of a global forest polity in its 
By-laws and Statutes. Noting that the purpose of the association is to “promote an 
adequate management of forests”, the statutes specify the contours of this polity as 
consisting of “developers of forest management policies, forest managers, legislators, 
and to any other person interested in forest management”. Unlike states, however, 
FSC constitutes a voluntary not a compulsory polity: individuals, associations and 
companies apply for join the FSC. If accepted, members have voting rights and may 
stand for election to the FSC-IC Board of Directors. Those who join the FSC “polity” 
endorse a vision of global forestry as “environmentally appropriate, socially 
beneficial, and economically viable management of the world's forests”. Notably, this 
vision does not specify forest type (boreal, temperate, tropical), scale of operation 
(small, medium, large), kind of enterprise (family farm, woodlot, cooperative, private 
firm, public corporation), or location (North or South). The absence of any qualifiers 
implies that no forest management operation is excluded a priori from achieving FSC-
IC’s vision and that FSC certification should be available to all regardless of size, 
kind, location or forest type.   
 
Early on, members involved in formulating a regional standard for BC do not appear 
to have appreciated the broadness of FSC-IC’s vision. Many of those drafting D1 
viewed FSC certification as applicable only to small-scale, ecoforestry operations 
under individual ownership or community forestry associations. Such individuals 
found it difficult to conceive of large industry ever meeting the requirements of FSC 
certification, since the defining attributes of ecoforestry7 were simply incompatible 
with industrial forestry management.8 This tension between visions—boutique versus 
general store—existed up until the 2002 FSC General Assembly where several 
advocates from BC sought to entrench a more forthright vision of ecoforestry at the 
international level and proposed a series of resolutions to give it effect. These 
resolutions were defeated, however, by the majority of those present, including 
representatives from indigenous and environmental constituencies.9 It was at this 
                                                 
6
 The first lines of Preamble to the Constitution Act 1867 are “Whereas the provinces of Canada, Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their desire to be federally united into one dominion under 
the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle 
to that of the United Kingdom…” (Government of Canada, Department of Justice 2006).  
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point that many closely associated with FSC-BC realised that FSC’s vision included 
large producers and that further negotiations would be required to adjust the bar 
established in D3 to secure their acceptance. 
 
Organisational Chart 
In addition to a Preamble referencing a polity and setting out a vision statement of its 
purpose and values, a key purpose of constitutions is to set out the basic structure of 
government in an organisational chart. Democratic constitutions set out whether the 
polity is to be governed by a unitary state or federally, by a single legislative chamber 
(unicameral) or two (bicameral), by a prime minister or a president, and by an 
appointed or elected judiciary. The process required for legitimate policy making may 
also be implied or specified. The general purpose of democratic constitutional 
provisions is to ensure that those in power are accountable to the people. Important 
mechanisms to achieve this are to provide for elections, divide power among different 
institutional elements of the system and establish a system of ‘checks and balances’ to 
prevent those in power using the state to oppress the people.  
 
In both parliamentary and presidential models, constitutions vest considerable power 
in the executive branch of government—the Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canada, or 
the President and White House staff in the US. Executive power is deliberately offset, 
however, by countervailing forces in other parts of the system. In federations, these 
reside in sub-national levels of government that have exclusive jurisdiction in some 
legislative areas and co-responsibility in others. Since neither level of government can 
abolish the other, disputes must be negotiated or adjudicated through a high or 
supreme court. Unitary systems of necessity lack this federal division of power, but 
along with federations make use of another mechanism—the separation of powers and 
the establishment of systems of “checks and balances”—mostly notably by 
distributing power to the legislature, executive and judiciary. In formal constitutional 
terms, the role of the executive is to propose policies and implement legislation; of the 
legislature, to consider legislative proposals and pass, amend or block them; and of 
the judiciary, to interpret and rule on their legality. 
 
The above sketch will be familiar to many readers. In order to examine FSC-IC’s 
arrangements, we need to focus likewise on the division and separation of powers 
established by its constitutional documents. In the following discussion, we first 
consider the division of powers in the FSC, observing that although it was established 
as a “unitary” system, it does have several “federal” features, notably a system for 
devolving responsibility to the regional and national levels. Then we consider the 
separation of powers within the FSC between its legislative, executive and judicial 
elements, examining how these interact in the making of the FSC policy.  
 
Division of powers 
Governments are unitary when power is vested in a single centre, and federal when it 
is divided among several geographic regions (i.e., states, provinces or territories). 
FSC-IC’s founding documents provide for a unitary structure, but one that over time 
could be increasingly devolved. Paragraph 71 of the By-Laws states that, ‘FSC shall 
encourage and support national and regional initiatives which are in line with the FSC 
mission’ and this it has done over the years. National and regional initiatives take 
several different forms: an FSC-IC-appointed contact person, a national working 
APSA-06-Gale-FSC 
 10
group, national advisory board, or a national or regional office.10 The By-Laws give 
only the broadest outline of the responsibilities of each arrangement.11 While a 
Contact Person is appointed by FSC-IC, national working groups are self-constituted, 
their primary purpose being to facilitate consultation. An advisory board, on the other 
hand, is elected by nationals, is similar in composition to FSC-IC, and has a more 
specific range of tasks. These include promoting FSC and its mission; providing 
information, support and services; maintaining ongoing consultation on certification; 
facilitating and overseeing the process of developing national (and sub-national) 
standards; and reviewing and making recommendations to FSC-IC on national 
certifying bodies (CBs) seeking FSC accreditation. A national office may be 
established wherever an advisory board exists and CBs are active. A national office 
relates to the national advisory board in the same way as the FSC-IC Secretariat 
(staff) relates to the FSC-IC Board—it is the bureaucratic arm of the national board.12  
 
The basic division of powers between FSC-IC and initiatives, whether regional or 
national, is set out as a positive list of rights that provide FSC-IC with final approval 
of standards and accreditation of CBs, control over the use of FSC’s name and logo 
worldwide, power to determine the category under which an initiative is established, 
and, crucially, the right to withdraw recognition. The only obligation placed on FSC-
IC is to consult with national and regional bodies prior to undertaking activities in a 
country or region. These several rights combined with a single obligation clearly grant 
FSC-IC pre-eminence over initiatives at lower levels, including the potentially 
coercive power of withdrawing recognition from any initiative that does not comply 
with FSC-IC requests. Despite this, there are numerous rights and obligations that are 
not clearly set out in FSC-IC’s constitution, creating unresolved tensions between 
different organisational levels. One of the most important of these is ‘taxation’ 
power—the right to raise and distribute funds to run FSC’s operations. Since the By-
Laws are silent on the issue, the presumption is that national initiatives have the 
power to raise and spend their own money and this they have certainly done. 
However, competition for donor funding between international and national bodies, 
especially in North America, has occurred and greater clarity on how regional and 
national initiatives are to be funded and FSC-IC’s responsibilities in this regard is 
required.13  
 
In the FSC-BC case, we noted that a great deal of confusion existed at the outset as to 
the status of the FSC-BC Regional Initiative in relation to the FSC-Canada Working 
Group and FSC-IC. Many provincial members viewed FSC-BC as quasi-autonomous 
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 The tensions between National Initiatives and FSC-IC are evident in a recent report by a self-
constituted National Initiatives Task Force. Arguing that FSC is a “tool” used by others to achieve their 
objectives, the Task Force makes far-reaching suggestions for change in FSC governance 
arrangements. At the centre of the Task Force’s concerns, however, are the current FSC-IC revenue 
model and the absence of any requirements on FSC-IC to distribute funds collected centrally to 
National Initiatives. A central recommendation of the Task Force is to replace Naitonal Initiatives with 
Field Offices, which we be funded centrally (National Initiatives Task Force 2005).  
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with a de facto right to report directly to FSC-IC rather than FSC-Canada. This 
separatist ethos was related to the almost simultaneous emergence of both 
organisations after 1996 and greatly strengthened by FSC-BC’s fundraising capacity, 
which outpaced FSC-Canada’s in the early stages. Lack of funds, a small staff, and a 
remote FSC-Canada Board meeting infrequently in Ontario all contributed to a 
perception within FSC-BC that it should make its own decisions and report directly to 
FSC-IC. From 2001 onwards, however, FSC-Canada—hardened by managing the 
FSC Maritimes dispute and under increasing pressure from FSC-IC to exercise a 
Canada-wide mandate—worked consistently to integrate regional initiatives into a 
more explicit organizational hierarchy. By the time D3 arrived at FSC-IC in the 
summer of 2002, BC’s separatist ethos was waning with regional members 
increasingly, if reluctantly, accepting the role and legitimacy of FSC-Canada and 
FSC-IC. Indeed, there is clear evidence of a winding down of the FSC-BC Steering 
Committee from at least the middle of 2003, although it remained formally 
constituted, and arguably still does today.14 However, the separate FSC-BC website 
has been replaced with the FSC Canada site and the regular meeting minutes and 
announcements are no longer available.  
 
Separation of powers: executive, legislature, judiciary 
In western liberal democracies, power is typically allocated among three branches of 
government: the legislature, executive and judiciary. A pure separation of powers 
would see citizens elect each body, but in practice this rarely occurs.15  Power is fused 
also in the FSC system, which lacks the equivalent of a legislature to debate policy. In 
the absence of a legislative assembly, FSC’s executive and legislative powers are 
largely fused in the elected, nine-member FSC-IC Board, which develops, debates, 
interprets and implements policy in conjunction with the FSC-IC Secretariat. The 
Board is not entirely separate either from FSC’s equivalent of a ‘judiciary’, the six-
member Dispute Resolution and Accreditation Appeals Committee (DRAAC). The 
Board appoints the DRAAC, which is constituted according to specific membership 
criteria for ensuring chamber, North/South, and regional balance.16 In this section, we 
review this relative fusion of powers in the FSC, highlighting areas where more 
separation may be desirable between its legislative, executive and judicial branches. 
 
Executive Government 
In parliamentary government, the executive consists of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C) and an extended bureaucracy organised into ministerial portfolios. 
                                                 
14
 FSC-Canada’s website gives a list of members of the FSC-BC Steering Committee “as of January 
2004” and there is no evidence this has been subsequently undated (http://www.fsc-
bc.org/SC_Members.htm). Jessica Clogg is listed as Co-Chair of the FSC BC Steering Committee on 
an FSC Canada Media Advisory of 30 March 2006, announcing a meeting of FSC members in BC to 
celebrate FSC-IC’s accreditation of the FSC-BC Final Standard (FSC-Canada 2006).  
<B)"?

"#
#"#
!	#	 6##"#
###	? 
2!#!	
!%6
"#		"#
"#%)		
#!"#
"#""!	#%)"?
"""
"#
 0#!	""
6##!	 #!	"3	%
<C+,, !"!#!""9'"
,#5D #",#" !!D/D,#
>D,D#,%.@
 *	(-%
APSA-06-Gale-FSC 
 12
Bureaucrats, ideally, provide “frank and fearless” advice to ministers about the 
consequences of different policy options, with the PM&C determining the actual 
course of action. A similar split exists at a formal level in FSC-IC’s executive 
between its “political” and “administrative” branches. Policymaking is formally the 
responsibility of FSC-IC’s nine-member elected Board representing diverse 
constituencies and regions, while implementation is the responsibility of the FSC-IC 
Secretariat, consisting of its Executive Director and staff, which may also propose 
policy initiatives to the board for discussion and approval. Just as in analysis of 
government, however, this formal distinction between political and administrative 
rule frequently breaks down in practice, with bureaucrats involved in policymaking 
and Board members overly interested in implementation and regulation.  
 
While the FSC-IC Board can be compared in terms of function to the operation of a 
political executive, the analogy breaks down across other dimensions. Unlike 
governments, for example, FSC-IC Board members are not full-time policy makers 
paid to consider the peoples’ business. Most, in fact, conduct their work on a part-
time and voluntary basis, splitting themselves between service to FSC and regular 
paid employment. The voluntary nature of the Board generates management 
difficulties in meeting on a timely basis and coping with the heavy workload. Because 
FSC is a global organization, some Board members find themselves travelling 
considerable distances to attend international meetings, entailing even more work 
time. In addition, and unlike government executives, the FSC-IC Board conducts its 
business across different interests, culture, languages and levels of development. 
These differences make it difficult for the Board to cohere as a single unit, in contrast 
to a cabinet where prime ministerial authority, party affiliation, frequent meetings, 
cabinet secrecy and fear of the opposition create a strong sense of solidarity. Many of 
FSC-IC’s management difficulties were aired in a 2001 Change Management Team 
Report, which identified inexperience and lack of training as impediments facing new 
Board members as well as a general tendency for Board members to over-involve 
themselves in technical matters—such as reviewing individual national standards—at 
the expense of strategic considerations. The Change Management Team 
recommended that roles and responsibilities of the FSC-IC’s Board should be 
redefined with the aid of NGO management experts. 
 
In addition to these managerial challenges, the usual organisational tension exists in 
FSC between those officially responsible for making policy and those charged with 
executing it.17 Such friction was evident between the FSC Secretariat and the FSC-IC 
Board following FSC-Canada’s approval and forwarding of D3 to FSC-IC. The 
bureaucratic arm of FSC-IC, its Accreditation Business Unit (ABU), had the role of 
reviewing all draft standards to ensure they conformed to a set of pre-established 
technical requirements. The ABU formed the view using its standard internal 
checklist that D3 was too long, detailed, unclear and prescriptive. D3 along with 
ABU’s draft report was circulated to FSC-IC’s Standards Committee, which had been 
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established only six months previously to reduce board members’ workload and 
involvement in the technical issues of standards review and approval. Some members 
of the SC were unhappy with the ABU report, however, viewing it as unfair and 
unduly influenced by industry lobbying. Rather than accept the ABU’s view, and 
recognising also the controversial nature of D3, they chose to refer it instead to the 
full FSC-IC Board for further consideration.18  
 
The ongoing tension between political and bureaucratic arms of an executive is also 
due to a board’s hiring and firing power. Governments have increasingly sought such 
power over the past two decades introducing new public sector management 
arrangements to ensure greater bureaucratic responsiveness to political decisions. 
FSC-IC’s Board has the power to hire and fire FSC-IC’s senior bureaucrat, its 
Executive Director (ED), with three holding office since the organisation’s founding: 
Tim Synott (1994-2000), Maharaj Muthoo (2000), and Heiko Liedecker (2000 to 
present). All three have experienced difficulties in office. Synott became enmeshed in 
the dispute over the approval of the FSC-Maritimes Standard, feeding mounting 
industry concern that its protests were being ignored by announcing the Standard’s 
accreditation just before Christmas 1999. Muthoo lost the confidence of the Board 
after a short period of six months due to his non-consultative style, illustrated in the 
Secretariat’s sudden announcement of an in-principle agreement with the Ontario 
Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR) to certify all of the province’s Crown 
forestlands with very little if any consultation with FSC Canada members.19 As 
Muthoo’s deputy at the time of the OMNR debacle, Liedecker took over on an interim 
basis and was later appointed following a search and interview process. Liedecker has 
performed quite well to date, ably assisted by the organisation’s relocation to Bonn, 
Germany, the increasing standardization of FSC’s arrangements with respect to policy 
development and standards approval and ongoing efforts by the Board to clarify the 
nature of its role and maintain the line between policy development and 
administration. 
 
Legislative Arrangements 
A key role of any political system is to pass legislation through parliament 
establishing the law of the land in a specific issue area.20 In parliamentary systems, 
legislation is introduced and subjected to three “readings” although the first and last 
reading tend to be pro forma. Under the practice of “responsible government”, derived 
from British historical experience, in theory the executive proposes legislation that is 
then extensively scrutinised and debated by the entire parliament, where necessary 
amendments are passed prior to approval. Notions of responsible government are 
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seriously compromised by the rise of the party system and today the PM&C can 
almost always secure the passage of legislation with as many or few amendments as it 
decides to allow. Matters are different when there is an active upper house of 
parliament, as in the Australian system, where senators do perform an effective 
scrutinizing role. Legislation which easily passes the lower house because the 
government “has the numbers” can encounter serious criticism and require significant 
amendment if the upper house is more independent and represents a wider diversity of 
interests and values.  
 
A sophisticated system of national legislatures is absent in FSC. Instead, the policy-
making function is split between the General Assembly on the one hand and the 
Board on the other. It is the responsibility of the Board to implement resolutions 
passed at General Assembly, but the thoroughness to which this is done depends on 
the degree of Board enthusiasm for a particular proposal. Between General Assembly 
meetings, the Board makes policy decisions on its own or with the assistance of 
specially appointed committees, such as the recently formed Plantation Policy Review 
Working Group to consult FSC members and the broader global forestry polity on 
options. Committees such as the PPRWG are constituted following consultations 
within FSC’s six subchambers and according to subchamber processes. In the case of 
the Environment North subchamber, for example, three candidates were nominated 
(Cadman, Kill and Palola) with Cadman and Kill elected in the subsequent round of 
informal, email voting.21 
 
Why did FSC not adopt an equivalent of a legislature? There is no easy answer to this 
but it likely reflects a desire to establish an organization that would not require large-
scale operational costs. Operational cost was certainly a concern of the Interim Board 
in the early 1990s when, following advice from James Cameron concerning the 
dangers of potential openness and the costs, it revised the draft Charter to alter the 
structure of FSC from an association to a foundation (Synnott 2005, 23).22 A 
foundation was deemed to be less costly institutional arrangement than a membership 
body requiring General Assembly meetings every three years. Certainly, there is not 
doubt that a legislative body mediating between the General Assembly and the Board 
would be costly since it would be required to meet much more frequently than a 
General Assembly and be much larger than the current Board. Whether these 
pragmatic consideration should outweigh those linked to concerns over democratic 
accountability is a matter to which we return in the conclusion.   
 
While legislation determines the broad parameters of a regulatory regime, it cannot 
provide for all possible circumstances and the bureaucracy is tasked with drawing up 
regulations that govern how it is to be implemented. In the FSC system, a similar 
distinction exists between policy and regulation with the elected FSC-IC Board 
determining a course of action and the FSC-IC Secretariat implementing it. The 
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 See email from membership@fsc.org to Fred Gale on the subject “Selection of Northern 
Environmental Chamber representatives for FSC Plantations review - Deadline December 20th”, 9 
December 2004. 
22
 Synnott (2005, 23) writes: “According to the [Interim FSC Board] Minutes, he [James Cameron] 
warned that a decision-making mechanism that depended on frequent General Assemblies and a 
relatively open membership would be unwieldy, expensive, and a severe limitation to the flexibility 
and decision-making capacity of the secretariat, and it would put at risk the balance of stakeholder 
interests” 
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adoption of the Policy for preliminary accreditation of national/regional forest 
stewardship standards23 is a good example of how this system operates in practice. 
The impasse that developed over D3 in 2002 led actors at all levels of FSC to search 
for an “extraordinary solution”, culminating at two meetings at the 2002 General 
Assembly involving members of FSC-IC, FSC-Canada and FSC-BC. The notion of 
preliminary accreditation was broadly accepted at the second of these meeting, with 
the FSC-IC Board formally approving the principle at its subsequent meeting. 
Responsibility at this point for the policy’s development was turned over to the Head 
of the Policy and Standards Unit, Matthew Wenban-Smith, who sought advice from a 
consultant, James Sullivan, on its utility and feasibility. Wenban-Smith subsequently 
submitted a detailed proposal on the policy and how it would work to the FSC-IC 
Board in early 2003 for approval and implementation.24 
 
Should the FSC General Assembly have been consulted on the new policy for 
preliminary accreditation? The question is interesting because it helps clarify the roles 
of the FSC-IC Secretariat, FSC-IC Board and General Assembly in constitutional 
change, policy-making, regulation and implementation. Preliminary accreditation was 
not a constitutional issue, since it did not alter FSC-IC’s fundamental documents—its 
Statutes and By-laws. Hence, there was no formal role here for the General Assembly. 
Preliminary accreditation did, however, necessitate a change in FSC’s arrangements 
for implementing certification and required Board authority to formulate the new 
policy.25 Once that authority was obtained, it was up to the Secretariat to implement 
the new arrangements, adjusting existing regulations and generating new ones to 
achieve the policy objectives.  
 
While the above analysis captures core elements of the different roles performed by 
FSC-IC’s General Assembly, Board and Secretariat, it is evident these roles are not 
completely separated. In this it mirrors the actual operation of government, where the 
bureaucracy are often heavily involved in policy-making, while Cabinet is often quite 
concerned about implementation. In FSC-BC case, members of the bureaucracy were 
heavily involved in conceptualising and championing the idea of preliminary 
accreditation. Jim McCarthy, FSC-Canada’s ED, building on extensive experience 
with the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), was especially influential, proposing 
the idea at the FSC-BC level, explaining it to officials at FSC-IC, defending it at two 
General Assembly meetings in 2002, and generally working to have the concept 
accepted as a way out of the impasse.26 Discussions occurred between McCarthy and 
Liedecker to overcome anticipated opposition in the South to exceptional 
arrangements for the North, it being agreed to present preliminary certification as a 
potential solution to standards development elsewhere. 
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 Matthew Wenban-Smith served as Head, FSC Policy and Standards Unit until January 2006, when 
he left to take up the position of Director of Forest Certification with the British consulting company, 
Dovetail Partners Inc. See http://www.dovetailinc.org/who.html, accessed June 2006.  
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Judicial Arrangements 
In a national political context, disputes invariably arise between citizens that require 
adjudication. Democracies manage such conflicts via an independent judicial system 
that is designed to mediate, arbitrate and pass sentence on the cases brought before it. 
Within the liberal democratic model, the judiciary is expected to operate at arms 
length from the political apparatus, be free from conflicts of interest, and be impartial 
in the administration of justice. While not free from corrupting influences—notably 
the capacity of the rich in liberal democracies to “buy” justice at times by hiring the 
best lawyers and to continue with litigation until others with fewer resources are 
bankrupt—the system works to deliver an element of justice at least some of the time. 
While FSC has adopted its own dispute resolution system to handle conflict within the 
FSC system, there is a general consensus that it is not working well and needs 
substantial reform. In this section, we review the structure and operation of FSC’s 
“judicial” branch of governance—its Interim Dispute Resolution Protocol (IDRP) and 
Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC).  
 
FSC has encountered several high profile conflicts over the years, including over the 
certification of Leroy Gabon in 1997, the Maritimes Standard (2000), the Allagash 
certification (2001), the challenge to Maracai, Brazil (2002), the denial of 
accreditation to KPMG,27 and of course the difficulties described in this volume in 
accrediting FSC-BC’s D3. Gregory Weber of the McGeorge School of Law, 
University of the Pacific, has taken a particular interest in FSC’s dispute resolution 
arrangements, drafting its 1998 Interim Dispute Resolution Protocol and reviewing 
the operation of dispute resolution arrangements over the past decade (Weber 2004 
and 2005a). In his recent review and at a Workshop held in Manaus, Brazil in 
conjunction with FSC’s 2005 General Assembly (Weber 2005b, 1), Weber highlights 
several deficiencies in current arrangements: the system takes too long, contains too 
many steps and provides insufficiently for conflicts of interest. In addition, FSC-IC 
lacks capacity to implement it in terms of staff, resources and training.  
 
A key problem with current arrangements is an insufficient separation of powers 
between FSC’s judicial and executive branches. Formally, FSC’s constitution and the 
IDRP provide for the following arrangements in the event of a dispute arising 
between parties over, for example, the awarding of a certificate by a CB to a 
company. The complainant appeals in the first instance to the certifying body and, if 
unsuccessful, may next appeal to its Independent Committee. Should these “informal” 
arrangements not result in a resolution of the dispute, the complainant may appeal 
directly to the FSC, which screens the complaint to determine its nature, and if there 
is no conflict of interest, forwards it to the FSC-Chair to mediate. Failure at this point 
enables the party to launch a further appeal by referring the complaint to the FSC-
Secretariat for screening and submission to the FSC Board for adjudication. The 
Board may refer the matter to the DRC and, if there is a failure to resolve the matter 
there, to the General Assembly, which has final authority. It is clear from this 
description that the process relies heavily on those who are already burdened by FSC 
work, some of whom may have a vested interest in the outcome. Not only is the 
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system itself open to charges of conflict of interest, but its complexity creates 
significant time delays and expense.28  
 
There is general consensus that FSC needs an improved dispute resolution system to 
the one currently in place. At the recent Manaus Workshop to consider the matter, 
several alternatives were canvassed ranging from minor alterations to existing 
arrangements to some that were more far-reaching. Weber outlined four possible 
models at the meeting, but all appear to fuse judicial and executive power to some 
degree, potentially jeopardising the independence (real and perceived) of the process. 
All four models described by Weber, for example, envisage a substantial role for 
organs of FSC—the ABU, the Board and/or a Board-appointed DRC. Of the several 
alternative models put forward by participants at the Workshop, only one by Errol 
Meidinger29 envisaged the establishment of a new institution—an FSC Disputes 
Office. While this is not the place to propose a detailed alternative to FSC’s dispute 
resolution arrangements, it is important to note that the general guiding principle 
governing such arrangements should be to establish a system that is as independent of 
the executive—FSC-Secretariat and FSC-Board—as possible.  
 
An improved dispute resolution system, however, will have to continue to distinguish 
between “technical” and “political” disputes within the FSC. This is more art than 
science, given the inherent difficulty of establishing criteria a priori to distinguish one 
from the other. The dispute over the Maritimes and BC D3 standards were more 
clearly political in nature—reflecting significant differences within local negotiating 
networks over whether an appropriate balance of interests existed on the standards 
negotiating committees and locally determined negotiating processes had been 
properly implemented. Other disputes, involving complaints about whether a 
certifying body should have issued a certificate to a company or not are of a more 
technical nature. It seems appropriate for FSC to maintain flexibility to determine 
whether a dispute should be resolved politically via discussion within and between 
various networks or judicially via, for example, a Disputes Office. Notably, in the 
FSC Maritimes case, a large-scale Committee of Enquiry was established, chaired by 
Gemma Boetekees, to determine the validity of claims and counter claims (Boetekees, 
Moore and Weber 2000). In the latter, as we have noted, the FSC system operated 
through different levels and networks to identify the Preliminary Certification 
solution. While a new dispute resolution process is required by FSC, it must be one 
that is capable of responding flexibly to the type of dispute requiring mediation.  
 
Amending formula 
States adopt a variety of arrangements to amend constitutions. In some cases, 
constitutions can only be amended via citizen referendums, while in others national 
and sub-national legislatures take the decision according to various rules. In Ireland, 
for example, constitutional change must first be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament and then be approved by a simple majority of the electorate. In federal 
Australia, not only is an absolute majority required in the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives and Senate to initiate the process, but the resulting referendum must 
be approved by a majority of the electorate in each of the country’s six states and two 
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territories, and represent a majority of the country’s citizens. Constitutional change is 
somewhat easier in Canada because referenda are not required. Instead, both Houses 
of Parliament must pass the proposed amendment, which according to the “7/50” rule 
must then be approved by the Legislatures of at least two-thirds of the provinces and 
territories representing at least 50% of population.  
 
Within FSC, it is the General Assembly that has authority to amend FSC-IC’s By-
Laws and Statutes. Paragraph 18 of the By-Laws states that the General Assembly 
“will normally restrict its decisions to revising the Statutes and Principles and 
Criteria, admitting and destituting members, electing the Board and being the final 
authority in dispute resolutions.” Although the General Assembly has ultimate 
authority, the FSC-IC Board plays a gate-keeping role30 and may block a resolution 
from proceeding to the General Assembly for vote, although there is no evidence it 
has ever done so. Similar to other General Assembly resolutions, amendments to 
FSC-IC’s Constitution require the normal super-majority vote of 66.6% in favour to 
pass, setting a suitably high bar for constitutional change and effectively requiring 
endorsement by all three chambers.   
 
There is clear evidence that the FSC-BC case prompted parties to seek to alter FSC-
IC’s Constitution via resolutions to the 2002 FSC General Assembly.31 Statutory 
Motion 6, for example, to “clarify FSC decision-making” provided for consensus-
decision making32 to apply at both the international and national levels, “to ensure no 
significant majority could be overruled.”33 Building on the FSC-Canada case, the 
clear intent of this motion entailed revisions to paragraph 71: “Guidelines and 
minimum requirements for national and regional initiatives that are consistent with 
the vision of the Founding Assembly shall be published by FSC and shall require that 
national initiatives seek consensus in their decisions.” If this motion had been in 
effect, FSC-Canada could not have approved D3 and forwarded it to FSC-IC. Instead, 
the matter would have had to be resolved differently—by either referring D3 back to 
FSC-BC with a request that more negotiations be entered into and consensus reached 
or by establishing a process at the FSC-Canada level to achieve a similar result.  
 
Bill of Rights 
As noted at the outset, FSC’s constitution does not contain a formal Bill of Rights and 
in this it is not any different from many other constitutions, past and present. While it 
might be thought unnecessary to consider this issue in the context of a mere voluntary 
“civil society” organization, it is interesting nonetheless to speculate on whether a bill 
of rights could add clarity to FSC’s constitution by setting out, for example, the rights 
that members have with respect to the other institutions, especially the executive. The 
purpose of a bill of rights is to safeguard citizens from abuse of state power and 
likewise, a purpose of a bill of rights or “accountability charter” is to protect members 
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of an organization from abuse of executive power. Interestingly, just such a charter of 
accountability has been developed by civil society organisations recently. Entitled the 
International Non-Governmental Organisations Accountability Charter, it sets out a 
range of expectations that the public can have about the operation of its signatories, 
which include Amnesty International, Transparency International, Greenpeace 
International and Oxfam International. The Charter promotes the values of 
transparency and accountability and commits signatories to a broad range of actions 
including the production of detailed annual reports, audited accounts, accuracy in 
information, ethical fundraising and safeguards for whistleblowers. While FSC is not 
currently a signatory to this charter, there is nothing to prevent it from signing. And it 
would seem to provide an excellent means of increasing the rights of its members to 
expect the highest levels of integrity, accountability and transparency from an 
organization that already has many other democratic forms.  
 
Conclusion 
As the above account makes clear, FSC’s governance arrangements are sophisticated 
and parallel those made by governments. FSC has constituted itself as a democratic 
organization with a governance system replete with checks and balances at local, 
national and international levels, enabling the organisation to put forward a good 
claim to represent the global forestry polity.  Diverse values and interests are grouped 
into a small number of formal constituencies and mediated by a balanced, 
representative, elected Board of Directors, which is accountable to members for its 
actions every three years at a General Assembly. These democratic structures are 
further strengthened by consensus-based decision-making, which operates at all levels 
of the organization. Unlike Roberts Rules of Order, consensus checks the 
authoritarian and majoritarian tendencies of modern electoral politics, where political 
parties seize power through the ballot box, promoting the values of specific sectors—
small business, big business or labour—as the general interest of all. In a globalising 
world, moreover, FSC has one major advantage over existing governmental 
arrangements—it formally includes interests regardless of their geographical location. 
This is in contrast to states, which by their very nature partition the world in two, 
giving voting rights only to those deemed citizens and excluding all others.  
 
The FSC is, moreover, sui generis in organisational structure. There is simply no 
other global organization of a similar nature. It does not easily fit the variety of non-
state actor typologies that have been developed and cannot be considered merely an 
exemplar of “private regimes” (Porter, Haufler and Cutler 1999), “private 
governance” (Pattberg forthcoming), or “non-state, market-driven” governance 
(Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004). While it bears some similarities with other 
organisations that fit such descriptions, the richness of FSC’s institutional 
arrangements suggest that it is something more: an instance of global democratic 
corporatism. While space does not permit a full expose of GDC, there are three 
important features of this mode of governance. First, the integration of interests across 
the North-South divide means that standards are developed that meet the test of 
developmental equality. Second, the channelling of interests into chambers—social, 
environmental and economic—means that networks of interests are created resulting 
in network politics—intra-network negotiations followed by inter-network 
negotiations. Finally, the emphasis on consensus-based decision making and on 
interest balance between economic, social and environmental groups means that 
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solutions are found that meet the needs of all—economic interests have a say but 
cannot override the interests of other groups.  
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